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ABSTRACT 
In the early 1950s, Willlard Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 
offered a devastating critique of logical positivism and the effort to 
distinguish “science” from “metaphysics.” Quine demonstrated that the 
positivists relied on dogmatic oversimplifications of both the world and 
human practices, and, in the end, suggested that our holistic natural 
experience cannot be reduced to purely logical explanations. In this piece, 
I argue that constitutional originalism—which, too, seeks to define a 
constitutional “science”—relies on similar dogmatisms. In particular, I 
contend that the “fixation thesis,” which claims that the constitutional 
judge’s first task is to fix the text’s semantic meaning at a particular 
historical moment, does not accurately describe the bulk of our current 
judicial practice. And, because semantic meaning arises predominantly 
from practice, the text’s semantic meaning does not depend upon an 
interpretive act of historical fixation. I also challenge the so-called 
“constraint principle,” which asserts that the text’s fixed semantic 
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meaning should constrain judicial efforts to construct legal rules. I 
suggest that we should think of this principle as embodying a particular 
normative theory of adjudication—one that would radically reduce both 
the number and kind of interpretive tools we have developed through 
centuries of practical experience. Thus, in the end I side with Edmund 
Burke and the English conservatives, who caution against replacing the 
collected wisdom of lived experience with the supposed certainties of 
abstract theory. 
 Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two 
dogmas. One is a belief in some cleavage between truths which are 
analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, 
and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma 
is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is 
equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to 
immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill-founded. 
—W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism1 
Writing in 1951, Willard Quine’s attack on empiricism was aimed 
primarily at the work of Rudolf Carnap and the logical positivists.
2
 His 
complaint, put much too simply, was that the positivists’ effort to neatly 
divide “science” from “metaphysics” tended to oversimplify the complex 
web of human practices and experience that condition our understanding 
of the world. Thus, the Kantian concept of analyticity makes sense only 
when embedded in a constructed concept of synonymy,
3
 and the reduction 
of meaning to verifiable observation works only within a shared account 
of how we translate our perceptions to logical assertions.
4
 Ultimately, 
Quine concluded that both dogmas of empiricism founder on the same 
shoal, which is the impossibility of accomplishing the exact one-to-one 
translation of one linguistic term into another without semantic 
remainder.
5
 That is to say, our holistic natural experiences of the world 
simply defy purely “logical” explanation—or, put another way, we have 
no unconstructed knowledge or experience that can truly differentiate 
“science” from other epistemologies. 
 
 
 1. WILLARD V. O. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 
(1953). 
 2. See generally id. (repeatedly addressing himself to Carnap’s work). 
 3. Id. at 22–23. 
 4. Id. at 39–41. 
 5. Id. at 41. 
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Constitutional originalism is, of course, not logical positivism, but 
there is, I think, some ground for relevant analogy. Originalism is, after 
all, an effort to separate constitutional “science”—the true or correct form 
of constitutional explication—from constitutional “metaphysics,” or what 
some like to call judicial activism. And, like the positivists, contemporary 
originalists make a determined effort to reduce meaningful constitutional 
assertions to those that we can verify in terms of the text’s historical 
meanings. Further, the criticisms I intend to level here at originalism are 
not exactly those that Quine made against positivism, but there are some 
parallels. For example, I will argue that originalism, too, relies on the 
mistaken assertion that our constitutional practices rely on some 
unconstructed or pre-theoretical “semantic meaning” that can constrain our 
efforts to synthesize relevant “legal” meanings or rules. Likewise, I will 
argue that the originalist effort to reduce our constitutional practices to 
particular forms of argument or understanding underestimates the 
complexity and value of our longstanding social and democratic traditions. 
To begin, though, I must set out the dogmas I intend to attack, and here 
I must rely on the very thoughtful work of Larry Solum, who has done 
perhaps the most to explain and justify the tenets of originalism, generally, 
as well as the approach now commonly known as New Originalism.
6
 
According to Solum, those who identify themselves as originalists, 
generically speaking, make two fundamental commitments: 
(1) Constitutional text has a “semantic meaning,” which can be fixed 
empirically at the time of its ratification; and (2) this “semantic meaning” 
must constrain judicial efforts to construct the legal rules that will apply to 
modern controversies.
7
 The New Originalists, for their part, view these 
commitments as making up two distinct phases of constitutional 
explication. Discovering “semantic meaning” is the task of what they call 
the “interpretation” phase; while identifying “legal meaning” takes place 
in the so-called “construction” phase.8 In Part I, I address the first phase, in 
which originalists arrive at the text’s fixed “semantic meaning” by 
discovering certain “linguistic facts.” In Part II, I address the reductionist 
problem of legitimizing “legal meanings” in terms of a single foundational 
referent, such as historical understandings. 
 
 
 6. E.g., Lawrence Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory 15 (Grant Huscroft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543. 
 7. Id. at 1–2. 
 8. Id. at 16. 
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I. THE FIRST DOGMA: THE FIXATION THESIS 
The “fixation thesis” is the first theoretical commitment essential to an 
inclusive brand of originalism of the sort that Larry Solum, Randy Barnett, 
and the New Originalists describe.
9
 This thesis asserts that at least some 
constitutional text has a “semantic meaning” which can be “fixed” or 
frozen at a particular historical moment—usually ratification—and that we 
can discover this meaning empirically as a matter of certain “linguistic 
facts.”10 Discovering these facts and fixing this semantic meaning is the 
aim of the “interpretation” phase of constitutional explication, which, for 
the New Originalists, is programmatically distinct from the later 
“construction” phase.11 As I discuss in more depth in Part II, originalism’s 
second fundamental commitment asserts that the “semantic meaning” 
discovered during the interpretation phase should constrain our efforts to 
construct a “legal meaning” in the subsequent phase.12 In Part I, however, I 
intend to demonstrate that the Interpretation-Construction Distinction is 
false, inasmuch as it does not accurately describe the way that 
constitutional practitioners actually engage and derive semantic meaning 
from constitutional text in most cases. Thus, the historical fixation of 
semantic meaning, even if theoretically possible (which I would not 
concede), is not a significant feature of the language games that make up 
the practice of constitutional law. In the next part I will offer reasons to 
think that this is a desirable state of affairs. 
To begin discussion of the fixation thesis, it is important to first 
observe that it relies upon two theoretical assumptions: 
 A sentence’s semantic meaning can be reduced to its utterer’s 
intentions.
13
 In the particular case of a constitutional sentence, the 
relevant “utterer” is not the text’s drafters, but rather its ratifiers. 
And it is not the individual ratifier’s subjective intentions that 
matter, but rather the contemporary public meaning of the text 
 
 
 9. See id. 
 10. Lawrence Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and A Reply to Professor 
Griffin, at 3 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers, Ser. No. 08-12, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130665; accord Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 11. For a more detailed discussion of the so-called “Interpretation-Construction Distinction” see 
Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 12. Solum, supra note 6, at 1. 
 13. See, e.g., H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH 
ACTS 41–58 (Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan eds., 1974) (presenting account of meaning grounded in 
“utterer’s intentions”). 
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they approved. For simplicity and consistency, I will call this 
“original public meaning,” and I will contrast it with “modern 
public meaning,” or the semantic meaning that a modern reader 
might derive when confronted with the text.  
 “Original public meaning” is discoverable by ascertaining certain 
“linguistic facts” about the ratifiers’ linguistic practices and 
context.
14 
 
In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that these basic assumptions do 
not accurately describe the actual practices that make up the constitutional 
language game, and, when it comes to semantics, actual practices are what 
matter. With this in mind, the originalist effort is best seen as a normative 
project intended to impose preferred theoretical constraints—constraints 
perhaps borrowed from other language games—onto the lived practice of 
constitutional semantics. Indeed, to the extent that we can identify stable 
or “fixed” kinds of semantic meaning in constitutional text, that stability 
results from modern—not historical—convergences in the practical rules 
that define the constitutional language game. Finally, while these 
interpretive convergences may appear to some to be “linguistic facts”—
either historical or modern—they are not a priori or analytic “certainties” 
that might move freely through social history or exist independently of 
their lived communicative contexts.  
A. Original Public Meaning and Our Constitutional Language Game 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s book Philosophical Investigations dramatically 
altered the way that many modern philosophers think about language, 
reference, and meaning.
15
 He repeatedly reminds us that the best way to 
understand language is not to theorize about its logical relationship to the 
world, but rather to observe how it is used in relevant communicative 
contexts, or “language games.”16 “To repeat don’t think, but look!”—he 
famously exhorts when exploring the various meanings of the word 
 
 
 14. E.g., Solum, supra note 10, at 3; accord Barnett, supra note 10, at 415–17. 
 15. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 2d 
ed. 1958) (hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS). On the book’s influence see, e.g., ROBERT J. 
FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN (2d ed. 1987); accord Brian Leiter, The Most Important Philosophical Books 
Since 1950?, LEITER REPORTS: A PHILOSOPHY BLOG (May 14, 2009, 9:02 AM) (recounting survey of 
esteemed philosophers that ranked Wittgenstein’s book as the most important since 1950), 
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/05/the-most-important-philosophical-books-since-1950. html?. 
 16. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15, at 20, 79–81. 
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“game;”17 and accordingly it is my intention in this Part to observe, not 
theorize, our constitutional interpretive practices. When we do this, it 
becomes apparent that the semantic meaning of constitutional text is not 
exclusively reducible to speaker’s intentions in any consistent practical 
sense. Indeed, in identifying the semantic content of the text, constitutional 
practitioners are generally more concerned with “audience meaning” than 
with “speaker’s meaning,” and thus the so-called “interpretation” phase is 
not a defining feature of the constitutional language game as it is actually 
played. Constitutional explication is, in other words, all “construction.” 
It is probably true that semantic meaning is completely reducible to 
speaker’s intent in some language games, perhaps paradigmatically 
specific, literal, one-to-one conversations. Paul Grice, upon whose work 
the New Originalists build, offered the following basic account of 
“meaning” in such circumstances: “[Saying] ‘U meant something by 
uttering x’ is (roughly) equivalent to [saying] U intended the utterance of x 
to produce some response in an audience by means of the recognition of 
this intention.”18 For example, suppose I return home from a walk, and my 
wife—who has just put the baby down for a nap—greets me at the door 
with her index finger pressed vertically across her lips. Upon seeing the 
gesture, I understand her to mean that the baby is asleep, thus I should be 
quiet.
19
 We might break this act of intention and meaning (what Grice 
called an “M-intention”) down into three parts. My wife put her finger to 
her lips intending: (1) that I believe I should be quiet because the baby is 
asleep; (2) that I recognize her intention that I form this belief; and (3) that 
this recognition is part of my reason for forming this belief.
20
 My wife 
could, of course, simply have said, “Please be quiet, the baby is sleeping” 
and conveyed the same meaning in a sentence. Thus, the gesture and the 
sentence have (roughly) the same semantic meaning, though the gesture 
 
 
 17. In this famous passage, Wittgenstein wrote: 
[Here] I mean board-games, card games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is 
common to them all? . . . To repeat: don’t think, but look!—Look for example at board-games 
with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many 
correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. 
When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are 
they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and 
losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. 
Id. at 31–32. 
 18. PAUL GRICE, Meaning, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 220 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 19. This is actually probably a case of “imperative” meaning, which is slightly more complicated 
than basic “indicative” meaning. See id. at 123. 
 20. This breakdown is helpfully explained in Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner, Paul Grice, 
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2009 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/sum2009/entries/grice/. 
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example makes it perhaps easier to see the relationship between intentions 
and meaning.
21
 The relevant difficulty, of course, is in explaining how and 
why I should recognize my wife’s gesture (or sentence) to convey the 
meaning she intended. For now, though, we can assume that this 
recognition arises from a fairly uncomplicated set of shared 
communicative assumptions and practices—as long as we note that more 
complex circumstances will require considerably more complex 
explanations. 
All in all, Grice’s model provides a helpful description of what it is for 
a person to “mean” something in a conversation, but it does not fully 
address other more nuanced and difficult communicative questions, such 
as what it is for a disembodied text to mean something as a matter of law. 
And, of particular interest in the constitutional context, it certainly does 
not address the questions that arise when that text addresses a future 
audience that may not share its authors’ language assumptions. In what 
follows, I illustrate the problem of complex contexts like these, where it is 
impossible to reduce “meaning” to “speaker’s intent” without semantic 
remainder. I will then argue that constitutional explication presents just 
such a circumstance.  
1. Original Public Meaning and Figurative Language 
A good example of a context in which we cannot fully assess meaning 
(even semantic meaning) in terms of original intentions is metaphorical or 
figurative language usage.
22
 Certainly a speaker may have an intention 
when constructing a metaphor, but the meaning of that metaphor will 
undoubtedly change as each member of the audience reconstructs it. In 
other words, modern public meaning is a vital and unavoidable part of 
communication in figurative language games. Consider, for example, the 
final two stanzas of E.E. Cummings’s poem: 
nothing which we are to perceive in this world equals  
the power of your intense fragility: whose texture   
 
 
 21. Grice himself moved on to consider several more complex kinds of interactions, perhaps the 
most notable of which is conversational implicature. See Grice, Logic and Conversation, supra note 
13, at 43. 
 22. Larry Solum has drawn a distinction between applicative, teleological, and semantic 
meanings. See Lawrence Solum, Semantic Originalism, at 3 n.5 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Papers, Ser. No. 07-24, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. I do not find these 
distinctions useful, and, in any case, throughout Part I use the word “meaning” to include even the 
more specific concept of “semantic meaning.” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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compels me with the colour of its countries,  
rendering death and forever with each breathing 
 
(i do not know what it is about you that closes  
and opens; only something in me understands  
the voice of your eyes is deeper than all roses)  
nobody, not even the rain, has such small hands
23
 
It is, I suppose, possible to believe that this text—complete with 
irregularities in format, capitalization, and punctuation—is ultimately 
reducible to Cummings’s specific and particular intentions when writing 
it.
24
 But that would be a very much impoverished and immature view of 
language, apropos to the child who repeatedly asks, “Yes, but what does it 
mean?”25  
Part of the reason for this is that it is unlikely here that Cummings has a 
literal intention. He is trying to communicate something that he may not 
fully understand with any specificity himself. And even if Cummings does 
have something concrete in mind, it is likely to be something that he 
cannot quite say literally. Rather, he is condemned, as Wittgenstein 
famously said, to “running against the walls of our [language] cage.”26 
Indeed, in such a circumstance a figurative speaker leaves it up to the 
audience to construct possible meanings out of his grammatical and 
syntactic irregularities, much like the example Max Black offers of a 
person shown a drawing of a straight line and asked to imagine a 
“collapsed triangle, with its vertex on the base.”27 And, further, it is these 
potential “audience” constructions that actually define the poem’s 
semantic, as well as its figurative, meaning. 
To further complicate matters, unlike the example of the sleeping baby, 
Cummings may not necessarily have any intentions about his audience’s 
beliefs, or about his poem’s effect on that audience. These are simply not 
necessary features of the language game that Cummings is playing when 
 
 
 23. E.E. CUMMINGS, Somewhere I Have Never Travelled, Gladly Beyond, in COMPLETE POEMS: 
1904–1962 367 (George J. Firmage ed., 1991). I must thank Robert Fogelin for introducing me to this 
wonderful poem in ROBERT J. FOGELIN, FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING 110 (1988).  
 24. Donald Davidson, among others, has vigorously defended the view that “metaphors mean 
what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.” Donald Davidson, What 
Metaphors Mean, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 415–26 (A.P. Martinich ed., 3d ed. 
1996). 
 25. The time-honored answer to this question is, of course, “What does it mean to you?” 
 26. Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Lecture on Ethics (1929), reprinted in 74 THE PHIL. REV. 3, 12 
(1965). 
 27. Max Black, More About Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 19, 32 (Andrew Ortony ed., 
2d ed. 1993). 
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writing the poem. Rather, he may simply hope to reveal something of 
himself to the audience—something that the audience can then reconstruct 
within the context of their own individual experiences.  
To put it simply, poetry is not language uttered within the same social 
context as shushing a potentially noisy father. It is, instead, part of a 
different, more complicated, language game in which meaning—even 
semantic meaning—is not completely reducible to original intentions.  
2. Original Public Meaning and Constitutional Explication 
Metaphorical or figurative language games are not the only deviations 
from the simple Gricean model. Indeed, constitutional explication is its 
own language game, which is neither quite figurative nor exactly like a 
literal one-to-one conversation. Here a legal text, submitted for ratification 
to hundreds of thousands of “the People,” is at the center of a complex 
communicative practice exercised within a unique and controverted social 
context. As with figurative language games, in the constitutional setting 
“speaker’s meaning”—even if it exists—is not the primary source of 
meaning. The initial reasons for this should be fairly clear on the surface: 
How can we know that the “ratifier”—from whom the constitutional text 
gets its legal authority—successfully understood the drafters’ meanings? 
What if the ratifying audience constructed and gave legal force to an 
entirely different meaning than that which the drafters intended? In other 
words, in the constitutional language game, it is not the speaker’s words 
that govern, but the ratifying audience’s understanding of those words. 
As I have noted above, the New Originalist solution to this initial 
problem is to treat the “ratifier” as the “speaker” for constitutional 
purposes.
28
 But this shift creates its own epistemological problems, for 
now the “speaker” is a plural and diverse entity, with plural and diverse 
intentions. Even in the most simplistic cases, when those intentions might 
theoretically be broken down to something fairly specific and literal, how 
can we hope to discover what tens of thousands of different minds 
intended to communicate in a text? And, even if we could discover and 
codify all those possible intentions, which should count in cases of 
 
 
 28. Barnett, supra note 10, at 419–20; accord Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 6, at 10 
(claiming that scholarly consensus has come to recognize that “the original intentions of the Framers 
could not serve as the basis for a viable theory of constitutional interpretation and construction”). But 
see Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540 (2013) 
(arguing that “[t]he meaning of a legal norm is just its authorially intended meaning”). 
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conflict? The most common? The most learned? The most “reasonable?”29 
In the face of these questions, the New Originalists have generally moved 
away from subjective individual “intentions” and embraced the concept of 
“original public meanings”—or a theoretically objective account of 
legitimate contemporary language conventions and practices.   
Although these shifts—from “drafters” to “ratifiers” and from 
subjective “intentions” to objective “public meanings”—do seem to get 
the New Originalist theoretically clear of the initial obstacles that plagued 
their predecessors, they do not resolve a more fundamental problem with 
the originalist (or, in truth, any normative) approach to textual 
interpretation: meaning is simply not a matter of theory—it is quite 
decidedly a matter of practice. And in the actual constitutional language 
game—as it is played here and now—we do not always, or even regularly, 
understand semantic meaning as an entailment of speaker’s meaning. 
Instead, in actual constitutional practice, what I have called modern public 
meaning has become the most important and determinative source of 
semantic meaning. Put another way—in phrasing that must resonate 
among students of statutory interpretation—in the practice of 
constitutional law we generally do not worry about discovering what the 
ratifiers intended, but rather work to better understand the text that they 
enacted.
30
 Sometimes, of course, we do turn to historical meanings in our 
interpretive efforts, but this is by no means our exclusive practice. And 
saying it ought to be our practice is simply inapposite when we are 
engaged in the purely descriptive enterprise of accounting for semantic 
meaning. 
The real question, then, is how, in practice, we do go about determining 
the content of semantic meaning as a modern textual audience. As with all 
language games, understanding meaning is a question of proper usage 
according to contextual rules; it is, in other words, a matter of social rule 
following,
31
 which is generally reflexive or instinctive, and not a matter of 
 
 
 29. Paul Brest lodged this compelling objection against the “old” originalism. Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
 30. The following passage from the pen of a prominent originalist is instructive:  
The Constitution gives legal effect to the “Laws” Congress enacts not the objectives its 
Members aimed to achieve in voting for them. If [the statute’s] text includes state and local 
administrative reports and audits, as the Court correctly concludes it does, then it is utterly 
irrelevant whether the Members of Congress intended otherwise. 
Graham Cnty Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 559 U.S. 280, at 302 (2010) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 31. Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein On Language and Rules, 64 PHIL. 5, 10 (1989). I suggest 
here, as I have elsewhere, that Philip Bobbitt has offered the best account to date of these rules as 
practiced in the constitutional language game. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/5
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conscious calculation.
32
 Thus, as linguist Steven Pinker has pointed out, a 
fluent English speaker knows instantly—for reasons she likely cannot 
explain—that “plast” and “thole” could be English words, whereas “ptak” 
and “nyip” could not,33 or that the sentence “He didn’t a few things” is 
improper, even when “He did a few things” is fine.34 As a product of 
instinctive rule following, then, semantic meaning often is not—as the 
“fixation thesis” suggests—a matter of discovering empirical facts about 
the world.
35
 As an example, think of commonplace words such as “not,” or 
“and,” or even “LOL.” There is nothing, no “referent,” to which we can 
point in the world to demonstrate these words’ meanings. Their meaning, 
in other words, is not absolute or empirically verifiable—and so the search 
for empirical referents is plainly not a part of the language practice that 
utilizes these words. Rather, we learn their contextual meaning by 
repeatedly playing language games that consist of particular linguistic 
rules, which we then learn to follow in rough—but not fully determined—
ways. Again, for example, “not” means, roughly, that the audience should 
reverse the truth-value of the subsequent proposition. In various contexts, 
“and” might ask us to think of the sum of prior and subsequent terms, or to 
hold those terms together in logical space, or to imagine some 
superimposition of those terms, and so on. To know what “LOL” means 
we would need to learn to follow the emerging rules of the “texting” 
language game. And, importantly, it is neither here nor there to theorize 
that “LOL” ought to mean “lots of laughs” instead of “laugh out loud”; all 
that matters is what it does mean in practice.  
This is not to say that we can never discuss or argue about how we 
ought to construct or follow social rules.
36
 It is to say, however, that this is 
not properly a question for the so-called “interpretation” phase of 
constitutional explication because, again, semantic meaning—inasmuch as 
it arises from shared assumptions and practices—is a matter of is, not 
ought. Again, it makes very little difference what one thinks a word should 
mean, if, in practice, it actually means something else—unless we think 
 
 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (describing the accepted “modalities” of constitutional 
argument). 
 32. See BOBBITT, supra note 31, at 185, 198, 211, 219. There is some scholarly disagreement on 
this point, see Malcolm, supra note 31, at 5, but I feel safe in saying that I have captured the consensus 
sentiment.  
 33. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 173 (1994). 
 34. Id. at 272. 
 35. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15, at 20, § 43; accord Dennis Patterson, 
Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM L. REV. 270, 303–04 (1993). 
 36. This is a question I have tried to answer in some depth elsewhere. See Ian Bartrum, 
Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 259 (2013). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:157 
 
 
 
 
there is some utility in the concept of a private language.
37
 So, for now, I 
simply reiterate my contention that actual constitutional practitioners do 
not make regular—much less exclusive—recourse to speaker’s meaning 
when following the rules of the constitutional language game. Thus, 
speaker’s meaning is not the exclusive, nor even the primary, source of the 
text’s semantic meaning. With that assertion in mind, it may be 
illuminating to consider whether I have accurately described (rather than 
theorized) our constitutional practices by exploring what we might call the 
“easy cases” of textual explication. 
3. Original Public Meaning and Easy Cases 
Quite often there is a broad social convergence or agreement on the 
appropriate usage rules governing constitutional text, and thus we 
collectively understand a great many constitutional phrases in specific and 
seemingly stable terms. We might here think of the Presidential Age 
Requirement, mentioned above, or the guarantee that each state shall have 
two Senators.
38
 In such circumstances, the social rules that determine 
textual meaning are uncontroversial and broadly recognized, thus making 
for easy cases. The existence of such cases leads some commentators to 
suggest that these broad convergences or agreements on social rules are 
like “linguistic facts,” which we can discover as though they were 
empirically verifiable.
39
 In the “easy cases,” then, these commentators 
suggest that practitioners actually go through something like a two-step 
“Interpretation-Construction” process, in which they first identify the 
“linguistic facts” that define semantic meaning, and then construct 
congruent legal meanings. For the originalist—who, again, would focus 
primarily on original public meaning—this means that we can look back 
and determine what convergences—or, again, “linguistic facts”—existed 
at the relevant moment of textual ratification.
40
 This is what they mean 
when they suggest that constitutional language has a historically fixed 
semantic meaning that is discoverable as an empirical matter.  
Some years ago, Randy Barnett undertook just such a process in 
making his case for the original public meaning of the Commerce 
 
 
 37. Wittgenstein, famously, did not believe in private languages, precisely because language is a 
social practice. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS supra note 15, at 81, § 202.  
 38. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3. 
 39. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 10, at 13 (“[W]hen we disagree about [semantic content] we are 
disagreeing about linguistic facts. In principle, there is a fact of the matter about what the linguistic 
content is.”).  
 40. Id. at 3. 
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Clause.
41
 Barnett engaged in an exhaustive, computer-aided search of 
language usage in founding-era dictionaries, the Constitutional 
Convention, the Federalist, the ratification conventions, and judicial 
interpretations between 1824 and 1935.
42
 After surveying all of these 
sources, he was able to conclude that a broad convergence of linguistic 
rules existed at or around ratification, which gave the Commerce Clause 
the following “fixed” public meaning: 
“Commerce” means the trade or exchange of goods (including the 
means of transporting them); “among the several States” means 
between persons of one state and another; and the term “To 
regulate” means “to make regular”—that is, to specify how an 
activity may be transacted—when applied to domestic commerce, 
but also includes the power to make “prohibitory regulations” when 
applied to foreign trade. In sum, Congress has power to specify 
rules to govern the manner by which people may exchange or trade 
goods from one state to another, to remove obstructions to domestic 
trade erected by states, and to both regulate and restrict the flow of 
goods to and from other nations (and the Indian tribes) for the 
purpose of promoting the domestic economy and foreign trade.
43
 
In response to critics who pointed out some possibly broader usages,
44
 
Barnett later increased the scope of his empirical inquiry by having 
research assistants perform an independent electronic search for every use 
of the word “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette between 1728 and 
1800.
45
 After this search, he was able to conclude that, once ambiguity and 
anomaly were accounted for, his original historical fixation of the 
Commerce Clause still stood.
46
 
Owing to some argumentative backlash over the past two decades, the 
Commerce Clause may not be quite so “easy” a case as the Presidential 
Age Requirement or Senate apportionment, but neither is it a truly “hard” 
case of textual vagueness like those I discuss in Part II.
47
 While there is 
 
 
 41. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 
(2001). 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 146. 
 44. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2002). 
 45. Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. 
L. REV. 847, 856–57 n.32 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 865. 
 47. On the evolution of constitutional meanings through argumentative practice, see Ian Bartrum, 
The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 327 (2009).  
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still debate around the living edges,
48
 the basic meaning of the Commerce 
Clause in our constitutional practice has not been in much doubt for nearly 
three-quarters of a century,
49
 and the word “commerce” does not seem 
inherently vague like other problematic phrases such as “equal protection 
of the laws” or “cruel and unusual punishments.”50 Indeed, what makes the 
Commerce Clause particularly instructive for purposes of this discussion is 
the contrast between the broad historical convergence on its meaning, and 
a different, but similarly broad, agreement today. Put another way, what 
Barnett’s exhaustive study allows us to see, in bold relief, is the conflict 
between the Commerce Clause’s “original” and “modern” public 
meanings. And, despite vigorous originalist protest,
51
 the original public 
meaning that Barnett so persuasively defends is simply not the semantic 
meaning that the phrase “to regulate commerce . . . among the several 
States” has in our current constitutional practice.52 Thus, in our 
constitutional language game, it is plainly modern—not original—public 
meaning that carries the day.  
 
 
 48. The most controversial commerce case in recent memory involved the anomalous assertion 
of a federal power to compel individuals to purchase health insurance. National Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct 2566 (2012). As such, that case presented a novel question of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that did not call into question the clause’s central meaning over the 
last 75 years. 
 49. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119–20 (1942) (holding that activities once 
thought distinct from commerce—“such as ‘production,’ ‘manufacturing’ and ‘mining’”—fall within 
Congress’s purview under the Commerce Clause, which cannot be delimited by any “formula”). It is 
certainly true that some modern decisions—notably United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)—have somewhat narrowed the scope of congressional 
authority under the clause, but there is still, I think, broad modern agreement that “commerce” 
includes activities (such as agriculture and manufacture) that remain well outside Barnett’s historical 
definition. (This is probably as good a place as any to note that, in the constitutional language game, 
reference to precedent is an important part of the rule following that establishes semantic meaning.). It 
is also true that some commentators—perhaps most notably Justice Antonin Scalia in concurrence in 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)—have tried to preserve a narrower semantic meaning for the 
Commerce Clause itself by arguing that so-called “substantial effects” analysis actually arises under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). But this distinction, while quite 
plausible (even as a matter of modern “audience” meaning), is certainly not one that the Court or 
practitioners always (or even usually) make. Indeed, the distinction is only interesting if one already 
believes that constitutional explication should involve something like an “interpretation” phase 
directed to uncovering historical semantic meanings. Nonetheless, originalist efforts like Scalia’s are 
slowly refining (or perhaps “reforming”) the Commerce Clause’s modern public meaning in an 
attempt to bring it back in line with its original public. See Bartrum, Metonymy, supra note 47, at 346–
93 (discussing argumentative refinement of constitutional meanings). With all of this in mind, though, 
I think I am still safe in saying that the Clause’s modern meaning (even its semantic meaning) remains 
significantly broader than the historical meaning Barnett asserts. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 51. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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The New Originalist likely wants to object here that the modern 
meaning of the Commerce Clause is actually just a constructed legal rule, 
and that the clause’s “semantic” meaning remains quite similar to that 
which Barnett identifies. To the contrary, I contend that the semantic 
content of the word “commerce” is different today than it was in 1820—
that we could do a similar modern search and come up with a different 
public meaning—and that it is the modern content that better explains the 
clause’s meaning in our practice. It is of no moment, semantically 
speaking, that this modern content derives, at least in part, from the 
Supreme Court’s shifting opinions on the question. That, again, is just a 
part of what is in terms of our modern constitutional language practice. Put 
another way, we simply do not, as a practical matter, go around trying to 
“fix” historical meanings; we rather play the only constitutional language 
game we can: our own.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the ratifiers whose intentions so 
concern originalists could have thought that, as a practical matter, we 
would use the text in the stilted and technical ways that the Interpretation-
Construction Distinction hypothesizes. Barnett himself concedes that a 
historical fixation project such as the one he undertook would have been 
“highly impractical” before the advent of electronic searches,53 which we 
can hardly expect the ratifiers to have foreseen. Nor does it seem 
reasonable to suppose that the ratifiers would have expected that 
understanding “the People’s” document would, as a threshold matter, 
require the kinds of specialized knowledge and painstaking research that 
this sort of historical fixation entails. No, for whatever it is worth, it is 
much easier and more reasonable to believe that the ratifiers thought we 
would interact with the text in much the same way that they interacted 
with legal texts: we would read the words and reflexively follow 
appropriate, socially constructed rules to give the sentences practical 
meaning. 
When we do this—when we, in Buck Owens’s words, “act 
naturally”—it becomes clear that the basic meaning of the Commerce 
Clause is actually a fairly easy case of constitutional explication.
54
 But 
what makes it easy is a broad convergence on the appropriate rules of 
constitutional language usage today—as employed by those reading the 
text—and not the kind of convergence that Barnett identifies among the 
language community that ratified it. Conversely, to the extent that the 
 
 
 53. Barnett, New Evidence, supra note 45, at 856 n.30. 
 54. BUCK OWENS & THE BUCKAROOS, ACT NATURALLY (Capitol Records 1963). 
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Commerce Clause sometimes presents more difficult interpretive 
questions, that difficulty results from a lack of modern convergence in our 
language practices. So, even if “easy cases” seem to provide evidence of 
stable constitutional meanings, these cases are not, in point of fact, 
examples of the historical meanings contemplated in the “fixation thesis.” 
And there are actually very good normative reasons why our constitutional 
language practice relies primarily on modern convergences in “audience 
meaning” rather than historical convergences in “speaker’s meaning,” but 
those, again, are best discussed in the context of the “constraint principle,” 
which I take up in Part II. For now, it is also important to emphasize that 
these modern convergences and the resulting “easy cases” are the product 
of holistic social phenomena, not “linguistic facts” that we might think of 
as capable of “fixation” in some unchanging or empirically “certain” kind 
of way.  
4. Social Rules Are Not Facts 
In thinking about the concept of “certainty” in the context of 
empiricism, Wittgenstein famously likened our knowledge practices to the 
relationship between a river and its banks: 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels 
for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and 
that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions 
hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
55
 
Of course, Wittgenstein’s thoughts here describe the potential fluidity of 
any supposed fact, but they apply so obviously and dramatically to the 
case of language that the very idea of a “linguistic fact” seems an 
especially egregious sort of empiricist dogmatism. Indeed, for 
Wittgenstein the case of linguistic instability was perhaps the most readily 
apparent manifestation of our more general empirical uncertainty—and 
thus the concept of a “linguistic fact” seems conceptually oxymoronic.56  
With this in mind, we can return to our observation of easy cases in the 
constitutional language game. An easy case of constitutional explication 
 
 
 55. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 15e, § 96 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright 
eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Harper & Row 1972) (1969). 
 56. Dennis Patterson has made the point very well: “The central tenet of Wittgenstein’s writing 
after 1929 is that knowledge is not achieved by the individual subject’s grasp of a connection between 
word and object. Rather, knowledge turns out to be the grasp of the topography of a word’s uses in 
activities into which language is woven.” Patterson, supra note 35, at 303–04. 
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simply reflects the existence of a “hardened” spot in the constitutional 
riverbank, which amounts to a broad convergence on the appropriate usage 
rules among the constitutional audience. Thus, easy cases are examples of 
stable constitutional meaning only inasmuch as the audience largely 
follows particular linguistic rules in a particular way. And, as Wittgenstein 
points out, even this stable ground can always shift—it is not actually 
“certain” or “factual” in any unchanging sense—and today’s easy cases 
may quickly become tomorrow’s hard ones.57 We need only briefly peruse 
the United States Reports to understand this point: As hard as it may be to 
imagine, there was a time when the phrase “due process” had a seemingly 
specific and stable meaning. Most importantly, we must not confuse these 
temporarily “hardened” spots with “facts” to which we might, like 
Odysseus, “fix” ourselves. They are nothing more (nor less) than rule 
convergences in a social practice woven into a particular historical form of 
life, and it is a profound mistake to try to rip those convergences from 
their lived context and import them into a different—in this case, a 
modern—world.58 Barnett’s theorized “commerce,” in other words, is 
simply not a part of our present form of life.
59
 
Notwithstanding all of this, one sometimes hears originalists claim that 
virtually every constitutional practitioner uses their approach when it 
comes to the easy cases; particularly those, like the Presidential Age 
Requirement, which do not seem to require the exhaustive kind of research 
Barnett undertook in the commerce context.
60
 The point seems to be that 
 
 
 57. This, of course, is just as true of historical meanings as it is of modern ones. 
 58. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15, at 8–9, 20, §§ 19–20, 43. The “form of life” 
reference here speaks to Wittgenstein’s larger philosophical claims. For a word to have meaning, it 
must function within an actual practice of life. It is when the philosopher extracts a word from its lived 
context and employs it in abstract theoretical pursuits that “language goes on holiday” and 
philosophical problems appear. Id. at 19, § 38 (emphasis removed). This, again, is why we must look 
and not think. 
 59. Another way of saying this is that our “historical” and “modern” forms of life (and 
corresponding language games) are incommensurable; thus, one cannot understand a phrase in one 
context without understanding a network of related concepts that simply do not exist in the other. See 
Thomas S. Kuhn, Rationality and Theory Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 563, 566 (1983) (making the same point 
about Newtonian and relativistic paradigms in physics); accord Batrum, supra note 36, at 259, 266–
67. Another, perhaps helpful, way to understand this point is through the lens of “translation.” Trying 
to “fix” semantic meaning across different historical language games is very much like translating or 
“paraphrasing” between different languages. For a fascinating account of these difficulties in the 
specific case of the Constitution, see Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind & Brian Patrick 
Quinn, Founding-Era Translations of the Federal Constitution, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486301. Translation and paraphrase are, of course, acts of 
construction. 
 60. I recently heard Randy Barnett make this sort of claim at the Fordham Law Review 
symposium entitled The New Originalism in Constitutional Law. See Barnett, supra note 10. 
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we are all originalists at heart—but this is simply not so. Though it is not 
as easy to see as with the Commerce Clause—where, again, a clear 
contrast exists between “original” and “modern” public meaning—when 
reading the Presidential Age Requirement we are all textualists, not 
originalists.
61
 That is to say, we all follow broadly shared modern, not 
historical, language rules to arrive at an uncontroversial meaning. It just so 
happens that, in the case of the Presidential Age Requirement, the 
“original” and the “modern” public meanings are virtually identical. While 
it is undoubtedly true that in some—but not all—cases a convergence of 
modern rules asks us to refer to historical language uses, this sort of easy 
case requires no such recourse to history. It requires only that we 
understand and follow fairly clear-cut modern usage rules. 
A more interesting version of this same sort of claim is sometimes 
made using the case of textual anachronisms. A common example is 
Article IV’s guarantee of federal protection against “domestic violence.”62 
If we were to go strictly by modern usage rules, so the argument goes, we 
would likely treat this text as referring to spousal abuse rather than 
intrastate hostilities—but that is clearly not what we do. So, the originalist 
claims that we must be looking to historical usage rules to clear up 
anachronism and arrive at the proper semantic meaning. Hence, again, we 
are all originalists. This is a more interesting case because here our 
modern usage rules do ask us to consider historical meanings.
63
 Again, 
however, when we look rather than think it becomes apparent that the 
historical usage rules do not actually determine the text’s semantic 
meaning. Rather, we perform a fairly simple sort of disambiguation that 
our modern usage rules require. The context in which the phrase appears 
seems nonsensical given modern practice, and so our rules refer us to 
historical usages to construct an alternate meaning. In the end we choose 
the historical meaning not because we are somehow bound by a speaker’s 
intentions and historical usage as the exclusive source of semantic 
meaning, but because, in this particular case, that meaning makes better 
sense of the text as we read it today. More importantly, this is simply an 
initial act of disambiguation, not a determinative account of semantic 
meaning. To determine what kinds of intrastate hostilities the phrase 
 
 
 61. The distinction, again, derives from Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional argument. 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For the example, see Solum, supra note 22, at 64; accord Barnett, 
Gravitational Force, supra note 10. 
 63. As Bobbitt has made clear, history does play an important—but not exclusive or necessarily 
determinative—role in our constitutional language game. BOBBITT, supra note 61, at 12. 
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“domestic violence” refers to we must again return to our modern 
language rules. Thus, the anachronism example shows only that historical 
meanings are sometimes a part of how we construct semantic meaning in 
our modern constitutional language game; it does not show that this 
recourse to history is required in every—or even most—interpretive 
undertakings.
64
  
In truth, it is only in these sorts of easy cases—those where we can 
identify specific and literal speaker’s intentions—that the New Originalists 
would even apply the “fixation thesis” in any strong sense.65 They would 
leave the more difficult cases of vague semantic meaning to modern 
constitutional “construction,” which I discuss in Part II. In other words, 
they concede that in such “hard” cases language and text ultimately fail to 
capture a specific semantic meaning—indeed, these may be the sorts of 
areas that Wittgenstein famously says “we must pass over in silence.”66 I 
hope, though, that I have shown that even in the easy cases it is primarily 
modern public meaning that establishes the semantic content of 
constitutional text—even if sometimes the rules that determine modern 
public meaning point us towards historical practices for purposes of 
disambiguation. And, contrary to the New Originalist account, these cases 
are actually just less controversial versions of the same process we engage 
when confronted with the hard cases of vague constitutional text. What 
this means, in the end, is that in our constitutional language practice the 
text’s constructed legal meaning is its semantic meaning—there simply is 
no distinct, a priori, “fact of the matter” to which we might bind ourselves. 
Constitutional explication is, as I have already said, all “construction.” 
II. THE SECOND DOGMA: THE CONSTRAINT PRINCIPLE 
Originalism’s second essential commitment is the “constraint 
principle,” which asserts that, as a general matter, the fixed semantic 
meaning discovered during constitutional “interpretation” should constrain 
our efforts to come up with legal rules in the “construction” phase of 
 
 
 64. We might, in other words, agree with the ratifiers that “domestic violence” refers to political 
hostilities rather than spousal abuse, but then make our own assessment of the sorts of political 
hostilities that count for constitutional purposes. 
 65. Solum, supra note 10, at 2. 
 66. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 7 (D. F. Pears & B. F. 
McGuiness trans., 2001). Though I do not take up the argument in this paper, I believe that we have 
difficulty “speaking” about these areas because they invoke moral or ethical reasoning of the kind 
Wittgenstein thought logically ineffable. 
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constitutional explication.
67
 In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that 
imposing such a reductionist constraint on judicial practice undervalues 
and undermines our complex and pluralistic interpretive traditions. I 
further suggest that we should always be wary of such efforts to cast aside 
a rich practical ethos in favor of any abstracted normative theory—no 
matter how intuitively attractive the new approach may seem. 
Larry Solum initially began to explore the ideas underlying the 
“constraint principle” when he articulated three possible formulations of 
what he called the “contribution thesis”: 
The extreme version asserts that a rule is a rule of constitutional law 
if and only if the content of the rule is identical to the semantic 
content of some provisions of the Constitution. 
The moderate version asserts that if the content of a rule is identical 
to the semantic content of a constitutional provision, then the rule is 
a rule of constitutional law, unless some exception applies, but it 
does not assert that this is the only source of constitutional law. 
The weak version asserts that the semantic content of the 
Constitution makes only indirect contributions to constitutional 
law.
68
 
In later work, Solum acknowledged that people who identify themselves 
as originalists might hold beliefs that range across this spectrum.
69
 But in 
truth it would probably be hard to find any constitutional practitioner who 
would not agree to at least the “weak version” of the “contribution thesis” 
as described above, and even many “living constitutionalists” would 
probably go along with the “moderate version.” With this in mind, Solum 
has more recently asserted that “[m]ost originalists agree on a fairly strong 
version of the contribution thesis, which we might call the constraint 
principle (constitutional doctrine must be consistent with original meaning 
absent very weighty reasons).”70  
There is still some potential ambiguity, however, about what it means 
for a decision to be “consistent with original public meaning.” In the 
 
 
 67. For a thorough description of this principle, see Solum, supra note 6, at 32. The “constraint 
principle,” of course, assumes that the “fixation thesis” is correct. It should be clear by now that I do 
not concede that point, but for argument’s sake I will proceed in this part as though I had. I should also 
note that, as we have now entered the realm of normative justification, in this part I generally depart 
from my earlier Wittgensteinian effort to look rather than think.  
 68. Solum, supra note 22, at 134. 
 69. Solum, supra note 6, at 31–32. 
 70. Id. at 32. 
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context of a so-called “constraint” principle, I take this to mean that 
constitutional doctrine should neither add to nor subtract from historical 
understandings. Thus, for example, the Court should not recognize an 
Equal Protection claim made on behalf of a class of persons (e.g., women) 
whom the ratifiers did not intend to protect in 1868.
71
 It is possible, I 
suppose, that “consistent with” could mean only that the Court should not 
subtract from historical understandings—for example, it would be 
impermissible to rule that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to 
African-Americans. If the latter is all that the “constraint principle” entails, 
then, as a practical matter, it is doing very little constraining, and it seems 
to leave originalism with very little to say.
72
 My argument thus assumes 
and addresses only the former, stronger version of the “constraint 
principle,” and may therefore be inapposite to some weaker originalist 
theories. 
With that said, the first important point to make here is that while the 
“fixation thesis” makes a descriptive or empirical claim about the semantic 
content of constitutional text, the “constraint principle” makes a normative 
claim about how we ought to translate that content into legal rules. A 
normative claim of this sort requires justification, and originalists offer 
what might fairly be described as a hodgepodge of possibilities.
73
 Solum 
has catalogued several varieties:  
Some originalists emphasize the rule of law. Others focus on the 
idea of popular sovereignty. Yet others emphasize the notion that 
the conventions of legal practice do not permit judges to 
deliberately overrule the linguistic meaning of the constitutional 
text. And still others may make the claim that adherence to original 
meaning is justified because it will produce better decisions in the 
long run than the alternative methods of constitutional interpretation 
and construction. It seems likely that many originalists will rely on 
some combination of these arguments, and others as well.
74
  
 
 
 71. Other similar examples might include the Court recognizing new “fundamental rights,” or 
contemplating new kinds of “commerce,” or concluding that the death penalty is “cruel or unusual.” 
 72. Such an understanding also creates ambiguities of its own, as we often cannot clearly 
distinguish what counts as “adding,” as opposed to “subtracting,” constitutional meanings. For 
example, “adding” to the scope of Congress’s commerce power necessarily “subtracts” from the 
states’ sovereign independence—as does adding “fundamental rights” or “suspect classes” to the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 73. See Solum, supra note 6, at 32 (listing some of these justifications). 
 74. Id. at 32–33. 
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All of these suggestions, of course, require some clarification of the 
relevant standards. We must know, in other words, what counts as a 
“better decision,” or a relevant “convention of legal practice,” or, for that 
matter, the “rule of law.” Originalist theorists have had varying degrees of 
success answering those questions. To assess these myriad efforts in 
limited space, it is necessary to make some (I hope justifiable) 
generalizations about their nature. 
To help with this, I turn to recent work by Mitchell Berman and Kevin 
Toh, which draws a very insightful distinction between approaches that 
attempt to justify the “constraint principle” as a theory of law, and those 
that attempt to justify it as a theory of adjudication.
75
  
Though Berman and Toh eventually disagree, I suggest that, as a 
general matter, “old” originalists—writing during the 1980s and early 
1990s—tended (rather uncritically) to treat their accounts as theories of 
law.
76
 That makes a good deal of sense when we recall that those 
commentators’ project was largely to critique the work of the Warren and 
Burger Courts. After all, the charge leveled against those Courts was that 
they tended to “make” the law rather than “interpret” it—they had, in other 
words, strayed from original meanings and had thus left “the law” 
behind.
77
  
The New Originalists, on the other hand, have taken on a different and 
much more difficult project, as they attempt to move originalism from 
critique to prescription. That is, they hope to offer an originalist 
methodology that the disciplined jurist might put into interpretive practice. 
As such, the New Originalists make it very clear that they are offering 
only a theory of adjudication—that, after all, is the gravamen of the 
Interpretation-Construction Distinction: the text’s semantic meaning is 
distinct from its “legal” meaning.78 In the remainder of this part I consider 
both types of justification for the “constraint principle,” and find neither 
satisfying.  
 
 
 75. Mitchell Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A 
Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 552 (2013). 
 76. Id. at 545.  
 77. See, e.g., Edwin Meese, III, Speech Before the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. 
(July 9, 1985) reprinted in STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ORIGINALISM: THE QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
DEBATE 47 (2007) (chastising the Warren and Burger Courts for engaging in a “jurisprudence of 
idiosyncrasy”). 
 78. Berman & Toh ultimately conclude that, despite the seemingly adjudicatory nature of 
constitutional “construction,” the New Originalists are actually offering a theory of law. Berman & 
Toh, supra note 75, at 575–76. 
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A. The Constraint Principle as a Theory of Law 
Perhaps the most intuitively attractive justifications for the “constraint 
principle” are those that assert that we should be bound to the original 
public meaning of constitutional text because that is what counts as “the 
law.” Indeed, the originalist protagonists of the 1980s seemed almost to 
take this point for granted. Robert Bork, for example, explained the need 
for originalist constraint as follows: 
If the Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of 
all other law, is the meaning the lawmakers were understood to 
have intended. If the Constitution is law, then presumably, like all 
other law, the meaning the lawmakers intended is as binding upon 
judges as it is upon legislatures and executives. There is no other 
sense in which the Constitution can be what article VI proclaims it 
to be: “Law.”79 
The normative claim here is straightforward, if not much explained: the 
text’s original public meaning simply is “the law”; thus, whatever 
obligations law places upon us, as a general matter, also justify the 
“constraint principle.” It is rather remarkable, however, that Bork makes 
almost no effort to justify his claim that we should view original public 
meaning as “the law.” Indeed, the quoted language is about as close as he 
comes to making out that case—and the operative word in that argument 
appears twice: “presumably.” 
Bork and his contemporaries are not alone in this view, however. More 
recently Michael Stokes Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan have made similar 
noises about historical meanings as the authoritative “law”:  
[T]o avoid creeping or lurching anachronism infecting the 
interpretation of an authoritative legal text, the proper approach 
must be one of “originalist” textualism—faithful application of the 
words and phrases of the text in accordance with the meaning they 
would have had at the time they were adopted as law, within the 
political and linguistic community that adopted the text as law.
80
  
To be fair, Paulsen and Kesavan are slightly more circumspect about their 
argument than was Bork—there is something more here than bald 
 
 
 79. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 145 
(1990). 
 80. Michael Stokes Paulsen & Vasan Kesavan, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1131 (2003). 
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presumption—but the essence of the claim is the same. Indeed, I think it is 
fair to say that the sorts of justifications Solum places under the heading 
“rule of law,” and, in other work, “writtenness,” both flow from this same 
basic commitment to historical meaning as “the law.”81 Thus, we might 
raise the same objection to each sort of account; namely, these “theory of 
law” approaches seem simply to beg the question. Or, to put it another 
way, deciding exactly what counts as “the law” is, in fact, the goal of the 
entire constitutional explication project. Indeed, if knowing what counts as 
“constitutional law” were as straightforward as discovering the “linguistic 
facts” that determine the text’s semantic content, we would hardly need an 
expert judiciary or a Supreme Court. Thus, as Philip Bobbitt has observed, 
these sorts of accounts are really an attack on the institutional legitimacy 
of judicial review as a whole—after all, we really have no reason to think 
that judges are better historians than are legislators, or anyone else for that 
matter.
82
 
But let us back up for a moment and consider these “theory of law” 
claims in light of the predominant jurisprudential approaches to the time-
honored question of “What is law?”83 Though there is some variation, the 
general thrust of the legal positivist account is to view “law” as a norm 
given a special kind of authority by a legal system’s “rule of 
recognition.”84 This “rule of recognition” is a secondary rule—a rule about 
other rules—and its content is based on the existence of certain social facts 
and group-wide behaviors.
85
 That is to say, the “rule of recognition” 
depends upon the kinds of broad convergences in social practices and 
reflexive rule following discussed in Part I—with a particular focus on the 
practices of relevant legal officials. Or, in Scott Shapiro’s much more 
elegant words, 
[T]he rule of recognition exists and has the content it does because, 
and only because . . . members of a group take the internal point of 
view toward a certain behavioral regularity and use it to evaluate the 
validity of norms that fall within their purview.
86
 
 
 
 81. Solum, supra note 22, at 133–34. 
 82. BOBBITT, supra note 61, at 156–62, 178–86.  
 83. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 1–34 (2011) (positing this question at the center of the 
jurisprudential tradition).  
 84. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100 (2d ed. 1994). Though there is a fair 
amount of modern variation on Hart’s argument, the broad contours of his positivist account of law 
remain the starting point for most discussions of the subject. 
 85. SHAPIRO, supra note 83, at 79–117. 
 86. Id. at 84. The phrase “internal point of view” is one of Hart’s terms of art, which means 
roughly that relevant officials follow the rule of recognition reflexively—or, more precisely, that they 
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The “rule of recognition” may also, on some accounts, incorporate certain 
moral norms in certain contexts, effectively giving those norms legal 
authority.
87
 The important point for purposes of this discussion, however, 
is that it turns out that legal positivism answers the question “What is 
law?” in much the same way that Wittgenstein approached questions about 
linguistic meaning: by looking at our actual practices.
88
  
When we apply this method to constitutional law, the claim that the 
text’s historical semantic meaning is, exclusively, “the law” does not fare 
very well. It is not the case, in other words, that relevant officials 
reflexively treat historical meanings as the only source of constitutional 
law.
89
 In practice, as Bobbitt has so insightfully observed, relevant 
officials actually engage in a complex sort of rule-following that involves 
several “modalities” of analysis and argumentation.90 In a given case, 
these officials might recognize norms generated by any or all of these 
modalities as legally authoritative. Historical arguments are plainly one 
such modality, but they are certainly not the only legitimate source of law. 
Indeed, at first blush we might easily make the case for ordinary 
textualism (the text’s current public meaning) or doctrinalism (reliance on 
precedent) as more regular determinants of what counts as constitutional 
law. On the positivist account, then, those that would justify the 
“constraint principle” as a theory of law face an uphill battle.  
With that said, the sorts of justifications that would seem to be closest 
to the mark here are those that Solum describes as “notion[s] that the 
conventions of legal practice do not permit judges to deliberately overrule 
the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text.”91 And it is of course 
possible that someday this sort of convention will actually govern 
constitutional practice, but I have not seen a persuasive case made that it 
does so today.
92
 
The other predominant jurisprudential school has its roots in the 
natural law tradition. Modern natural lawyers, again, hold a variety of 
 
 
believe they are doing their job when they follow it. For more, see Scott Shapiro, What is the Internal 
Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006). 
 87. This is sometimes referred to as “inclusive” or “positive” legal positivism. See, e.g., Jules L. 
Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 139 (1982). 
 88. Thus, for the positivist the content of law ultimately seems to be a question of “is” rather than 
“ought.” 
 89. I need only refer back to the discussion of the Commerce Clause in Part I to illustrate this 
point. See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text.  
 90. See BOBBITT, supra note 61, at 12–13. 
 91. Solum, supra note 6, at 32. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text for discussion on 
the potential ambiguity of the word “overrule” in this context. 
 92. See discussion infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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views about what counts as law,
93
 but the core idea is that both social and 
moral facts determine the content of “the law.”94 To be “law,” in other 
words, a norm must have something like the descriptive characteristics 
Hart asserts, and it must be just.
95
 On this account, we can discover “just” 
laws in nature, or through natural processes, but they are not simply 
“created” or “recognized” by legal systems. For many natural lawyers, the 
evolutionary model of the common law can function as one such natural 
process.
96
 The most important point, however, is that the content or 
legitimacy of “the law” is ultimately a matter of moral reasoning or 
philosophy. 
On a natural law account, then, the sort of justifications Solum labels as 
“popular sovereignty” theories would seem the most promising. Such a 
justification might claim something like the following:  
 Constitutional text gets its moral authority from the ratifying vote 
of the sovereign “People.”  
 That moral authority extends only to those textual meanings the 
“People” understood themselves to authorize.  
 Therefore, changes made to this meaning without the “People’s” 
authorizing consent do not count as “law.”  
On such a view, then, the reason that original public meaning should 
constrain constitutional construction is that it, and only it, has the requisite 
moral authority to be “the law.” This seems to be something close to what 
pundits are claiming when they assert that the Supreme Court should 
“interpret” rather than “make” the law. 
The problem with such a justification, however, lies in its second 
premise, which asserts that only the text’s original public meaning has 
sufficient moral authority to be law. There may, in fact, be compelling 
moral justifications for other sources of constitutional law; indeed, many 
commentators view at least some development of common law principles 
 
 
 93. John Finnis provides a sophisticated modern approach, which sometimes looks a lot like 
legal positivism. See, e.g., John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 195 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). 
 94. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 211 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 95. Id. The essential commitment that divides positivists and natural lawyers is sometimes called 
the positivists’ “separation thesis,” which asserts that there is no necessary connection between law 
and morality. See Jules Coleman, On the Relationship Between Law and Morality, 2 RATIO JURIS 66 
(1989). 
 96. See, e.g., John C. H. Wu, The Natural Law and Our Common Law, 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 
(1954) (exploring the connections between natural and common law). 
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as just such a natural and justified source.
97
 Even more troubling for such a 
view, the text itself expressly authorizes a federal judiciary with 
jurisdiction to decide “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the 
Constitution”98—with an original public meaning (by most accounts) that 
implies the power of judicial review.
99
  
With these thoughts in mind, it seems that the originalist who would 
justify the “constraint principle” must demonstrate that modern judicial 
decisions do not enjoy the moral authority—perhaps even derivative of 
“the People’s” moral authority—necessary to count as constitutional law. 
The originalist might respond, of course, by suggesting that only some 
judicial decisions—those related to original public meaning in the right 
sorts of ways—have the requisite moral authority. But such a refinement 
would not seem capable of dealing with hard cases of unknown or vague 
original meaning, in which we simply cannot identify “speaker’s 
meaning” with any real certainty.100 In such a case, this approach suggests 
that there could be no constitutional law, because there is no underlying 
original meaning to bestow the necessary moral authority. This result 
seems very much at odds with many natural law approaches, which would 
instead charge the judge with reasoning her way to a just rule.
101
 
Despite the intuitive attraction, then, real obstacles lie in the path of 
those who would justify the “constraint principle” as a theory of law in 
either the positivist or natural law traditions. That is not to say, of course, 
that these obstacles cannot be overcome, and it may be that I am 
overlooking some accounts that have made a serious attempt to do so.
102
 It 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 43–46 (2010) (defending the 
candor and Burkean legitimacy of the common law model of constitutional development); see also 
ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997) (justifying the Constitution primarily in terms of its common law 
foundations); see also BOBBITT, supra note 31 (rooting the modalities of constitutional argument in the 
common law tradition). 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 99. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 100. This might result either from the use of vague terms—such as “cruel or unusual”—of from 
cases of unforeseen application—such as whether a wiretap counts as a “search or seizure.” 
 101. See generally Wu, supra note 96 (surveying intellectual history of connection between 
natural and common law). 
 102. It is important to note here that several scholars have made excellent arguments—including 
positivistic arguments—asserting that the text’s original public meaning is one important source of 
constitutional “law”—but I have not seen a persuasive claim made that it is the only source of that law. 
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 10, at 27 (defending his “moderate version” of the “contribution thesis”); 
William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law (forthcoming) (on file with author) (arguing that “inclusive 
originalism” is our positive law). These may be successful defenses of the “moderate contribution 
thesis,” which I take to be a fairly inclusive theory of adjudication (with which I might agree), but they 
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is to say, however, that it is a mistake for originalists simply to assume 
that the text’s original public meaning is “the law” in a way that doctrinal, 
structural, or contemporary readings of the text are not. It may be that 
historical meanings deserve to have exclusive priority either in our 
practices or in our moral philosophizing, but, if that is true, it cannot be so 
simply because a particular interpretive theory makes that claim. In a 
liberal state what counts as “the law” is, at the very least, something more 
than bare fiat. 
B. The Constraint Principle as a Theory of Adjudication
†
 
The New Originalists—folks like Larry Solum, Randy Barnett, and 
Keith Whittington—seem to understand the difficulties in justifying the 
“constraint principle” as a theory of law, and thus make it clear that their 
approach is to treat it as a theory of adjudication. Indeed, this is the basic 
claim of the Interpretation-Construction Distinction, which asserts that the 
semantic meanings fixed during the “interpretation” phase are not—at 
least not exclusively—the Constitution’s legal meaning, which we arrive 
at (under historical constraints) during the “construction” phase.103 Thus, 
original public meaning is not “the law,” but it should nonetheless 
constrain our adjudicative efforts to apply the text to actual legal 
controversies.  
Seen this way, the “constraint principle” seems to make a 
consequentialist rather than a deontological claim. That is, we should 
constrain judges to original public meaning not because of an obligation to 
follow “the law,” but rather because judging in this way will tend to 
produce better results over time. Thus, Randy Barnett has argued that 
originalism is the best guarantee of our civil liberties in the face of ever-
shifting (but always avaricious) political winds.
104
 If this is true, we could 
justify the “constraint principle” instrumentally in terms of its service to 
civil rights, rather than trying to argue that original public meaning is the 
 
 
do not justify the “constraint principle” on the grounds that original public meaning is the exclusive 
source of constitutional law. 
 † Some of the material in this part first appeared in Ian Bartrum, Originalist Ideology and the 
Rule of Law, 14 JCL ONLINE 1 (2012), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl_online/vol14/iss1/2/. 
 103. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 453, 456 (2013). 
 104. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
117 (2004) (“Only if lawmakers [including judges] cannot change the scope of their own powers can 
the rights of the people be in any way assured.”). 
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only true source of constitutional law.
105
 This sort of argument is certainly 
more sophisticated—and frankly more plausible—than claims that ground 
constraint in the deontological primacy of original public meaning. 
Offered as an instrumental or consequentialist theory of adjudication, 
however, the ultimate value of the “constraint principle” is contingent on 
what we think should count as “better” results or consequences. This is a 
significant difficulty, because, again, in constitutional explication this is 
essentially to beg the question. That is to say, deciding what is a “better” 
constitutional result—in the short term, or over time—is exactly the 
question facing the judge in such cases. And to claim that historical 
meanings should always constrain the judge in the service of “civil 
liberties” (for Barnett) is really just to claim that courts should always 
work to maximize, or at least protect, those liberties. While that seems like 
a laudable goal in many cases, there are certainly instances in which 
competing interests—say, “national security,” or “law and order”—may 
complicate matters. For this reason, I contend that no single foundational 
approach to adjudication—historical or otherwise—can adequately explain 
or justify our constitutional practices. The contours of this argument, 
however, are easier to make out when we confront the problem of “hard 
cases” of constitutional explication—those involving certain kinds of 
textual vagueness or unforeseen applications—which I have not yet 
examined in any detail.  
In practice, disputes about textual meaning rarely arise over 
determinate constitutional provisions like the Presidential Age 
Requirement. I hope I have shown that this is not because the historical 
meaning of this text is clear and binding, but instead because in such cases 
the relevant modern linguistic rules are suitably precise and our practices 
well enough settled that the law essentially speaks for itself.
106
 Instead, it 
is the underdetermined or vague constitutional language that gives us 
trouble, exactly because the underlying rules and practices governing its 
meaning are themselves imprecise and controversial. Logically speaking, 
the vagueness problem is straightforward: A vague proposition may have 
no determinate truth-value.
107
 Whether it is true, for example, that a 
 
 
 105. See id. (“In this way, constitutional legitimacy based on natural rights, rather than popular 
sovereignty or consent, can ground a commitment to originalism.”). 
 106. We do not, in other words, go through a two-step Interpretation-Construction process in such 
cases, but instead reflexively play our contemporary language games.  
 107. The late and eminent David Lewis summarized the issue well: 
If Fred is a borderline case of baldness, the sentence “Fred is bald” may have no determinate 
truth value. Whether it is true depends on where you draw the line. Relative to some perfectly 
reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary between bald and not-bald, the sentence is 
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particular kind of punishment is “cruel or unusual” depends upon how we 
evaluate cruelty, and it may be the case that two perfectly reasonable kinds 
of evaluation yield contradictory results. And with ordinary language such 
as the Constitution, we cannot, as David Lewis says, “pick a delineation 
once and for all . . . but must consider the entire range of reasonable 
delineations.”108 Thus, unlike the Presidential Age Requirement, the 
Eighth Amendment cannot speak for itself, and so requires an interpreter. 
In our legal tradition, that job lies primarily with the judge, who draws 
upon her expertise and experience as a constitutional practitioner to fill in 
the gaps in constitutional law.
109
 
At this point, for the New Originalists, semantic meaning begins to thin 
out and constitutional “fixation” or “interpretation” becomes increasingly 
difficult. In particularly difficult or borderline cases, semantic meaning 
may run out entirely, making “fixation” of any sort impossible, and in 
such circumstances there is simply nothing left to “constrain” our efforts at 
constitutional “construction.” Thus, the New Originalists concede that 
these cases may require judges to rely on non-originalist reasoning.
110
 
Originalism then, “new” or “old,” is simply not applicable in cases of 
genuine textual vagueness, and so I will not dwell on those here. Rather, 
the focus must be on what I will call the “hard cases,” those where there is 
some original public meaning that might constrain construction, but not 
enough to be determinative. These are often cases of unforeseen 
application—those where our constitutional “speakers” did not anticipate 
(or could not have anticipated) a particular controversy—but they may 
also be what I will call aspirationally vague cases, in which the ratifiers 
clearly had a particular textual meaning in mind, but may not have 
intended to foreclose other potential meanings.
111
 An example of the latter 
 
 
true. Relative to other delineations, no less reasonable, it is false. Nothing in our use of 
language makes one of these delineations right and all others wrong. We cannot pick a 
delineation once and for all (not if we are interested in ordinary language), but must consider 
the entire range of reasonable delineations. 
1 DAVID LEWIS, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233, 244 (1983). 
 108. Id. “Reasonable” here points toward the accepted practical usage conventions, which may, 
again, be underdetermined. 
 109. Note here that these are the very gaps that confound the “theory of law” justifications—
particularly natural law justifications—given for the “constraint principle.”  
 110. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 103, at 535–37. 
 111. For example, Ronald Dworkin has famously made the distinction between a concept and its 
conceptions: 
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others unfairly. I no doubt 
have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not accept that my 
‘meaning’ was limited to these examples . . . . I might say that I meant the family to be guided 
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situation might be the question of whether the ratifiers intended for the 
Equal Protection Clause to outlaw preferential treatment for African-
Americans. In these sorts of cases, there is clearly still a role for the 
“constraint principle.” In cases of unforeseen application, original public 
meaning can offer constraining points from which to extrapolate our 
constructive constitutional line; and in aspirationally vague cases it can 
eliminate some potential future meanings as plainly out of bounds (think 
here again of women and the Equal Protection Clause). Indeed, if 
originalism is to have any meaningful bite in our constitutional practices, 
it seems it must be in constraining judges as they decide these sorts of 
cases. 
As discussed above, the “constraint principle” does not, as a descriptive 
matter, univocally govern our constitutional practices in these “hard” 
cases. Rather, practitioners make a number of different—sometimes 
competing—claims grounded in something like the six modalities of 
argument that Bobbitt has described.
112
 This is in keeping with the 
common law tradition from whence these modalities arose, and it is in 
these longstanding judicial practices that we have placed our constitutional 
trust in cases of unforeseen application and aspirational vagueness.
113
 That 
is to say, within our conception of the “rule of law,” the application of text 
to real world controversies is what Brian Tamanaha has called the “special 
preserve of judges,”114 whom we trust to develop particular expertise in 
our constitutional language game.
115
 With this in mind, we can see that 
efforts to constrain this judicial authority in the service of external value or 
policy preferences—even those as laudable as protecting civil liberties—
are essentially ideological or normative claims made against our 
constitutional tradition and practice. 
Indeed, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the decision to adopt a 
particular argumentative modality to decide a constitutional case is 
ultimately a matter of choosing between competing constitutional 
 
 
by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness I might have had in 
mind. 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 167 (2013). 
 112. See BOBBITT, supra note 61, at 12–13. 
 113. On the structural and prudential legitimacy of the common law development of aspirational 
text, see STRAUSS, supra note 97, at 43–46. 
 114. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 232, 244 (2012); see generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, 
POLITICS, THEORY (2004). 
 115. Sean Wilson has very insightfully analogized this expertise to the kind of “connoisseur 
judgment[s]” Wittgenstein described in his later work on aesthetics. SEAN WILSON, THE FLEXIBLE 
CONSTITUTION, at 89–99 (2013). 
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values.
116
 In other words, the judge who places particular value on civil 
liberties might, in a particular case, choose to rely on historical 
conceptions of constitutional meaning, while the judge who values 
constitutional flexibility might ground her decision in prudential or ethical 
arguments.
117
 And this is exactly as it should be. In cases of unforeseen 
application or aspirational vagueness, our legal tradition and our 
longstanding ideas about the rule of law ask us to entrust our judges and 
the common law tradition with our constitutional fate. Put another way, in 
a government dedicated to the rule of law, the lawmaker who hopes to 
bind future generations to specific or determinate legal conceptions must 
make those conceptions explicit in the enacted text; otherwise she turns 
the matter over to common law development. There is a difference, in 
other words, between declaring that the President must be “mature” and 
requiring that he “have attained to the age of thirty-five years,” and 
tradition requires us to recognize the law in the particular form that it 
appears. When that form is aspirationally vague or otherwise 
underdetermined, we must accept that the law leaves questions of 
explication to its designated interpreter—the constitutional judge. 
C. The Constraint Principle As Radical Challenge to Our Interpretive 
Traditions 
It is true that entrusting judges with the kind of broad authority I have 
described presents its own substantial risks to the rule of law. There is the 
danger, as Tamanaha points out, “that the rule of law might become rule 
by judges”; that is, if the courts cannot remain politically neutral and 
“loyal to the law alone,” we might just as easily find ourselves subject to 
the arbitrary whim of a judge as of any other man.
118
 Indeed, it is precisely 
this danger that inspired the originalists of the 1980s and early 1990s. But, 
such fears notwithstanding, it is simply not the case that a theorized 
“constraint principle” is the only normative restraint capable of thwarting a 
tyrannical judiciary. In fact, it is difficult to identify a single period of our 
history when anything like a strong version of the “constraint principle” 
univocally governed our interpretive practice,
119
 and yet we still live in a 
 
 
 116. Bartrum, supra note 36, at 263–64. 
 117. See id. at 287. 
 118. Tamanaha, supra note 114, at 244 (emphasis in original). 
 119. For a well-researched and thoughtful account of these practices, see H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). Powell presents two 
fundamental schools of antebellum American legal thought—an anti-hermeneutical tradition born of 
Protestant biblical interpretation and a constructivist approach rooted in common law adjudication. Id. 
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generally democratic political community free from oppressive judicial 
whim.  
This is so because judges are, in fact, bounded in their decision-making 
by a complex and evolving body of interpretive norms—something like 
those that Bobbitt and others have described—which define and legitimate 
their published opinions. Indeed, Bobbitt and others have persuasively 
analogized these norms to the kinds of social rules Wittgenstein saw 
governing our linguistic practices.
120
 And so in a very real sense, judges 
must speak fluently in our constitutional language, and opinions that 
depart too radically from the inherited interpretive norms (think here, 
perhaps, of Dred Scott v. Sandford) are very much like assertions offered 
in a foreign tongue.
121
 In truth, these evolving practical norms, built and 
adapted over centuries of lived democratic experience, better keep judges 
within the contours of our collected political wisdom than any external 
normative theory ever could. 
The “constraint principle,” at least in its strong versions, presents just 
such an external normative theory, and so represents a radical challenge to 
these longstanding interpretive traditions. I have suggested repeatedly that 
any realistic description of our constitutional practices must acknowledge 
a fairly diverse set of interpretive approaches, and I hope I need not take 
up too much space here justifying that claim. Whether it is structural 
argument in McCulloch v. Maryland,
122
 doctrinal argument in United 
States v. Morrison,
123
 or ethical argument in Reynolds v. Sims,
124
 even a 
brief tour through the United States Reports refutes any notion of a 
practice constrained to historical arguments or original public meaning.
125
 
As Richard Fallon has put it, 
 
 
The constraint principle is, of course, a hermeneutic (and thus outside of the first school), and—as an 
exclusive method—an approach without foundations in the common law tradition. See, e.g., RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2001) (observing that originalists concede that 
their approach has never rigidly governed Supreme Court practice); accord Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) (“[O]riginalism is not, and ha[s] 
perhaps never been, the sole method of constitutional exegesis.”). 
 120. See Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837 (1994) 
(assessing the Wittgensteinian roots of Bobbitt’s work). 
 121. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 122. 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819). 
 123. 529 U.S. 598, 613–17 (2000). 
 124. 377 U.S. 533, 557–58 (1964). 
 125. For more discussion of these cases and interpretive approaches, see Ian C. Bartrum, The 
Modalities of Constitutional Argument: A Primer, in READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD 203 (Linda H. Edwards ed., 2012). 
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[T]he originalist model departs radically from actual Supreme Court 
practice. As originalists themselves acknowledge, doctrines that are 
of central importance in contemporary constitutional law could not 
be justified on originalist grounds. These include doctrines that 
ensure broad freedoms of speech, enforce so-called one person, one 
vote principles, and prohibit various forms of race and gender 
discrimination. Had the Court been rigidly originalist in the past, 
important steps toward social justice and fair political democracy 
likely would have been postponed, if not forgone.
126
 
Once we recognize, with Fallon, that the “constraint principle” would 
replace well-worn interpretive traditions with a normative theory imposed 
from without, it is not too great a leap to understand originalism as a 
radical kind of movement—a movement born in reaction to the perceived 
extravagances of the Warren and Burger Courts. Indeed, despite the cloak 
of “conservatism” often cast over it, modern originalism asks us to break 
sharply with legal interpretive practices rooted in English traditions that 
predate the Constitution.
127
 Thus, perhaps ironically, the judicial 
philosophy most closely associated with the American Right is open to 
many of the same criticisms that English conservatives have long made 
against abstract liberalism. 
Perhaps most famously, Edmund Burke championed the liberating 
wisdom of lived experience, contextualized traditions, and modest 
evolution over the “pretended rights of [the] theorists.”128 In a particularly 
relevant passage, he offers a stern warning against reductionist efforts to 
adopt any a priori principle as settlor of future, real-world political 
controversies: 
The world of political contingency and political combination is 
much larger than we are apt to imagine. We can never say what 
may, or may not happen, without a view to all the actual 
circumstances. Experience, upon other data than those, is of all 
things the most delusive. Prudence in new cases can do nothing on 
grounds of retrospect. A constant vigilance and attention to the train 
of things as they successively emerge, and to act on what they 
 
 
 126. FALLON, supra note 119, at 3 (citations omitted). 
 127. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL 
LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004). 
 128. EDMUND BURKE, BURKE’S REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 50 (Paternoster 
Row 1793), available at http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO 
&userGroupName=sain79627&tabID=T001&docId=CW3303795547&type=multipage&contentSet= 
ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
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direct, are the only sure courses. The physician that let blood, and 
by blood-letting cured one kind of plague, in the next added to its 
ravages.
129
 
It is, then, dangerous to set out in advance any binding, foundational 
theory of judicial interpretation; and it is all the more dangerous when that 
theory would radically reduce the number and kind of interpretive tools 
available to the judicial practitioner—tools that have emerged from 
centuries of lived experience. Indeed, Michael Oakeshott has employed 
the tool analogy to make largely the same point: “The carpenter comes to 
do a job, perhaps one the exact like of which he has never before tackled; 
but he comes with his bag of familiar tools and his only chance of doing 
the job lies in the skill with which he uses what he has at his disposal.”130 
Much the same might be said of the judge, upon whose judicial skill and 
expertise the rule of law depends; and we should be wary indeed about 
limiting the number of tools in her kit, or the circumstances under which 
she may use them.
131
 
Burke’s warnings are perhaps most apropos to the particular 
instrumental benefit Randy Barnett sees justifying the “constraint 
principle.” Recall that Barnett grounds the principle’s normative authority 
in his belief that historical interpretive constraints will best protect “the 
rights of the people” against tyrannical encroachment.132 But Burke 
offered a particularly acute criticism of the notion that natural rights or 
freedoms are the product of abstract or theoretical constraints on state 
authority: 
Civil freedom, gentlemen, is not, as many have endeavoured to 
persuade you, a thing that lies hid[den] in the depth of abstruse 
science. It is a blessing and a benefit, not an abstract speculation; 
and all the just reasoning that can be upon it is of so coarse a 
texture, as perfectly to suit the ordinary capacities of those who are 
to enjoy, and of those who are to defend it. Far from any . . . 
metaphysics, which admit no medium, but must be true or false in 
all their latitude; social and civil freedom, like all other things in 
common life, are variously mixed and modified, enjoyed in very 
 
 
 129. 4 EDMUND BURKE, Thoughts on French Affairs, in THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 324, 
352–53 (Oxford University Press 1907) (1791). 
 130. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, On Being Conservative, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 168, 180 
(1962). 
 131. For an enlightening account of judicial expertise in terms of “connoisseur judgment[s],” see 
WILSON, supra note 115, at 89–99. 
 132. BARNETT, supra note 104, at 117. 
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different degrees, and shaped into an infinite diversity of forms, 
according to the temper and circumstances of every community.
133
 
Again, Burke reminds us that true civil rights are not the product of 
speculative political science, but rather emerge from lived experiences, 
from hard-won conciliations, and from the trial and error resolution of 
actual human controversies. The practical interpretive norms that define 
modern judicial decision-making and justification represent just the sort of 
collective, experiential wisdom that Burke celebrates; while the imposition 
of a theorized “constraint principle” in the name of civil rights is exactly 
the hubris he laments. As with many would-be reformers, the originalists 
are much too ready to cast aside the work that has come before—in this 
case, centuries of interpretive tradition and practical expertise—in their 
zeal for a new and better world. Better, I suggest, to try to understand our 
traditions as they are, and to add our own experiences to the many political 
lessons woven into the interpretive fabric we are blessed to have inherited. 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary originalism is not the same theoretical approach that 
dominated political headlines in the 1980s and 1990s, but the underlying 
normative motivations are quite similar. They are both efforts to separate 
legitimate and illegitimate judicial approaches, in something like the way 
that Rudolf Carnap and the logical positivists hoped to distinguish 
“science” from “metaphysics” in the first half of the last century. And just 
as Willard Quine exposed the dogmas upon which the positivists 
depended, I hope I have here offered some reasons to question the 
“fixation thesis” and the “constraint principle” at the heart of modern 
originalism. To that end, I have argued that we do not, as a practical 
matter, engage in the kind empirical search for historical meanings that the 
“fixation thesis” supposes—and linguistic meaning is, after all, a matter of 
practice and not a matter of fact. Nor do historical understandings actually 
constrain our practice of constitutional “construction,” which is governed 
instead by the inherited norms of the common law interpretive tradition. 
Efforts to justify historical constraint as a preferred theory of adjudication 
amount to the elevation of one particular constitutional value in all, or at 
least most, cases; and this kind of value foundationalism tends to 
 
 
 133. Letter from Edmund Burke to John Farr and John Harris, On the Affairs of America (Apr. 3, 
1777), in EDMUND BURKE: SPEECHES ON THE AMERICAN WAR AND LETTER TO THE SHERIFFS OF 
BRISTOL 167, 205–06 (A. J. George ed., D. C. Heath & Co. 1891). 
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deprecate and destabilize our longstanding democratic traditions. This is 
not to say, of course, that those traditions cannot, or will not, change over 
time, but it is to say that such a change must emerge organically from our 
practice itself and not from the imposition of theoretical dogmas on the 
practiced art of constitutional judging. 
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